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Abstract:
Data mining techniques have been widely used as a com-
mon goal to discover hidden patterns from big data sets, so
researchers have been motivated to make use of data in discov-
ering useful information. The main contribution of this paper
lies in its identifying relevant features from an open data set
to predict the containment time of Cyber incidents. In partic-
ular, 13 relevant features were identified and selected to come
up with a predictive model. Our results are discussed in the
context of the organization’s’ information security.
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1. Introduction
In the recent years, companies have been pushed to trans-
form themselves into data-driven organizations because of
technological developments in the big data infrastructure
[9]. This has brought an increment inaccessible organi-
zational data for researchers or users. There is even a
huge amount of data available in organizations. However,
these data cannot be used directly, which means that the
raw data needs to be pre-processed towards extracting the
hidden patterns, semantic information, and useful features
[10]. This operation is referred to as feature extraction from
data. Data driven security management has been commonly
adopted to uncover hidden patterns in data and respond with
countermeasures. In the business world, data is used to
identify and analyze the situation of an organization [15].
In order to achieve data-driven security management in the
big data area, undertaking feature extraction to mine useful
information is necessary.
Prediction, forecasting, and extraction of associated fea-
tures have become an inevitable approach in the business
area. In analyzing social cases [18], extraction of useful in-
formation from a big data set plays a key role for organiza-
tions [13]. There are various approaches to achieve feature
extraction from big data. In our case, data-driven security
management is adopted through feature evaluation, and rel-
evant features are then selected to predict the containment
time of an incident. The containment time is defined as a pe-
riod of time from the moment of incident discovery until the
moment of containment. The importance of containment is
explained in [3], which is extremely important in stopping
the attacker from making more damage to the system. It is
stated that the main part of containment is decision making
[3]. Thus, if there are predefined strategies to contain the
incident, decision making can be much easier. Hence, ac-
ceptable risks need to be defined by organizations; and on
top of that, some containment strategies need to be devel-
oped to deal with incidents.
We claim that if organizations know the relevant features
on the containment time, it can be much easier to predict
the incident’s containment time, adopt specific strategies for
it, and decide which features (risk) are acceptable or unac-
ceptable. For this reason, this paper focuses on identifying
relevant features on the containment time of an incident. In
particular, we used an open organizational data set to under-
stand organization’s situation better in terms of information
security. The main contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows: 1) it identifies the relevant features on
the containment time of a cyber security incident, and dis-
cusses them with regards to organizations’ security issues
(feature selection), 2) it interprets key findings from exper-
imental results in terms of information security, and 3) it
develops and interprets a model by using selected features,
which is a transformation from data through information to
knowledge.
2. Related Works
Different detection approaches can be utilized to find at-
tack patterns from data. One of these approaches is referred
to as feature selection. Feature selection can be explained
essentially as identifying features relevant for predicting a
class value by using machine learning approaches [7]. In
other words, it is utilized to identify the relationships be-
tween the features and class values in a data set. In the
context of security management, it is aimed at identifying
which features have an effect on the containment time of
incident in order to minimize the exorbitance and maxi-
mize the relevance of the features (a subset of the selected
features) [12]. Once a set of relevant features is selected,
meaningful points can then be deduced.
According to [12], a large number of features can be ir-
relevant to the class value in a security data set. In this case,
it is highly necessary to adopt machine learning algorithms
for the automatic evaluation and selection of features. The
feature selection can be achieved by using three main ap-
proaches; namely, filter, wrapper, and embedded ones [12].
Features are graded by looking at their statistical impor-
tance in the setting of filter based methods [5]. In the set-
ting of wrapper methods, features are selected heuristically
based on the classification accuracy of the classifier trained
on the subset of the features [8]. Embedded methods pred-
icate feature selection on classifier [14]. The performance
of these methods is considered reputable because of the de-
termined class value [21]. Based on this, we utilized the
approach proposed in [12].
When an incident is detected by a system or organization,
it needs to be undertaken for the information security of a
system. As explained by [1], to mitigate an incident’s dam-
aging impacts on a system, an effective reaction needs to
be given. There are some significant points of incident re-
sponse such as containment, discovery, eradication, and so
on [2]. In this paper, containment time will be the main
point of investigation. The goal of incident containment
is preventing the incident from spreading, stopping the in-
cident, and regaining control of the compromised system
[20]. In [16], the containment time is explained thoroughly
and defined as the discovery and contain of incident.
The previous studies produced different methods and
techniques to tackle the issues of organizational information
security. However, it has never been tried to deduce which
features could determine containment time of a Cyber inci-
dent. It has thus motivated us to detect relevant features on
the containment time of a Cyber incident. Concurrently, we
aim to discover new information by using raw data.
3. Proposed Solution
In this section, we present steps that need to be taken to
find a solution to the problem. The most important points
are choosing suitable data sets and tools to obtain efficient
results. We chose VERIS‘s data set VCDB to achieve our
aim for the reason that it has enough records and each
record contains excessive features. As it is known, the more
features you have on a data set, the more questions you
get. The VCDB has over six thousand and eight hundred
records and over two thousand features. The VERIS data set
aims to help organizations collect useful incident and shar-
ing qualified information with others [16]. VERIS Commu-
nity Database offers a solution to researchers interested in
security incident problems, and to risk managers who lack
reliable, unrestricted, and comprehensive raw data sets of
security incidents available for download [4]. The second
step is data cleaning and pre-processing, which depend on
the research questions with a view and focus of the data set.
Firstly, we need to analyze which features of the original
data set are irrelevant for the study. Secondly, whether an
incident has distinctive value or not needs to be judged, e.g.,
if an incident only involves a binary value (true or false), it
does not make sense to include that value in our case. Fi-
nally, it is necessary to identify feature redundancy cases,
e.g., there can be different incidents which have intersec-
tions and these incidents can be gathered under an incident.
As previously mentioned, it is crucial to decide on ap-
propriate tools. In this paper, we use the WEKA tool, since
it has a powerful feature selection function with many dif-
ferent options in line with our purpose. In particular, we
chose the best-first and ranker options. The best-first option
brings the relevant features based on their importance for a
class value (for this paper, class value is containment time).
The ranker part arranges the importance of the values by at-
tributing numbers to them. We focused on feature selection
by identifying irrelevant features on the VCDB data-set. It
allowed us to select relevant features to specific class value.
4. Results
This section presents our experimental setup and results
reported using WEKA [19]. Effective features of the con-
tainment time of a Cyber incident were found by applying
feature selection algorithms on the tool.
As mentioned earlier, the main aim of this paper is to
explore features relevant to containment time. To achieve
this goal, two parameters need to be set for feature selec-
tion; namely, attribute evaluator and search method. Each
attribute is evaluated within the context of class value. The
experiment’s results are presented in tables. More details
on [19] are provided by the University of Waikato wikipage
[19]. We created our own data set after editing the VCDB
original data set. Figure 1 indicates how many relevant fea-
tures we obtained from VCDB.280 data set by using feature
selection filters.
Figure 1. Directions of the experiments
4.1. Experimental Results
Through feature selection, relevant attributes are se-
lected, i.e. redundant and/or irrelevant attributes are re-
moved from the feature set. As described in Section 2, there
are two types of feature evaluation methods; namely, filter
and wrapper. The former is considered to be an independent
evaluation and the latter is essentially based on learning al-
gorithms. In our experiment, filter approach is adapted to
select a subset of attributes, which is based on the infor-
mation gain and gain ratio filters because they are capable
of capturing high correlation between features and the class
attribute [19].
The results are presented in Table 1, which includes the
results of running information on WEKA. In [19], differ-
ent attribute evaluators are used to compare their perfor-
mance. The most important parts are underlined and the
first underlined one is the instances and attribute values. As
it was mentioned in previous sections, 224 attributes were
taken from the VCDB data set after editing and shrink-
ing/cleaning. Another point is that the data set contains
6861 records, and none of the original records were re-
moved. The second underlined point is the class value,
which, in our case, is containment time. The section shows
the relevant features, which affect the containment time.
The results show that the aim of this paper is achieved from
the experiments. The meanings of these features are ex-
plained in the data analysis part of this paper.
















Table 2. Selected features’ Value
Selected attributes Provided Information
Attribute It shows which security
attributes were compromised
during an incident
Asset Asset describes compromised
information gains
during an incident
Action it identifies what is the cause
and contribution of the threat
to an incident
Response it answers questions
are first how the incident was covered,
what was the remediation process of it,
and how the discovery of incident is done?
Victim It shows importance of victim’ details
Table 2 presents a brief explanation what information se-
lected features provide. Features are summarized in five
main types that are namely action, asset, response, at-
tribute and victim. We used the ranking filter to see fea-
tures’ effectiveness on the containment time. The Cor-
relation Ranking Filter gave us the result ”Selected at-
tributes: 11,5,4,10,3,2,9,6,1,8,13,12,7”. In Table 1, the fea-
tures could be put in order from top to bottom. Based on
the ranking filter, it is evident that the most effective feature
on the containment time is action incident. It helps us to
decide the sizes of our model, which is given in Section 5.
As can be seen from the experiment, our aim is achieved by
performing experiments on [19] and applying filters on it.
13 specific attributes out of 224 are selected to predict the
containment time (to clear a possible confusion; 13 features
excluding the class value of data set).
4.2. Interpretation of Results and VCDB Analysis
We analyzed our work with security issues in mind.
The first analysis was conducted through feature predic-
tion analysis, which was done by using the WEKA tool.
The second analysis was carried out by using extracted fea-
tures from the WEKA on the VCDB data set, which was
the original data set used in our work. Figure 2 shows our
technique, which provides information about our directions
for doing each analysis. The first analysis is from contain-
ment time to features, and it indicates that if a new Cyber
incident’s containment time needs to be predicted, then the
relevant features need to be known. For the second part,
we are basing our analysis on our experiments’ result with
regards to the containment time of incidents. This means
that if we know the effective features on the containment
time of incident then we can identify how long it will take
to contain it. The features related to containment time of an
Figure 2. Analysis technique
incident were presented in the previous Section 4 in Table 1
that provides related features’ names. Based on the results
of those experiments, five main classes can be determined;
namely, action, asset, attribute, response, and victim. The
benefit of classification features is that it helps one to under-
stand these features in terms of security in organizations.
Action as it is given in the requirement and analysis part,
the description of the action in the VERIS is that it iden-
tifies the cause and contribution of the threat to an inci-
dent. It can be either malware cause, hacking cause, mis-
use, error, social, environmental cause, or physical cause.
Action.physical.variety.Theft was the result of the experi-
ments in our case. The primary question is how that feature
can be interpreted in the sense of security. The statement
of “Action.Physical.variety.Theft” is that if the action is de-
liberate physical theft threat, then it can be claimed that the
prediction of its containment time could be much quicker
than other possibilities. Other possibilities are given in [16].
There are six possible primary categories apart from phys-
ical action. By looking at the results of the experiments, it
can be argued that although there are three other possibili-
ties under the physical category, predicting the containment
time of theft could be the shortest time for organizations. To
make it clear, in our world, employers have given comput-
ers, laptops, or mobile devices to their employees. Physical
theft is completely related to physical devices. This means
that in case the physical devices are stolen, the company
can lose crucial data that is on the device. As it has been
understood from the experiments’ results; if it is physical
theft, then its containment time prediction may be quicker
then others because of the sensitiveness.
The second feature is attribute value. It shows which se-
curity attributes were compromised during an incident. The
security attributes are confidentiality, possession, integrity,
authenticity, availability, or utility. When the results of ex-
periments are evaluated, it is clearly seen that availability is
one of the most relevant features on the containment time.
All the results received, other possibilities, and their mean-
ing in terms of security are clarified. Attribute.availability
is one of the results in our case. This means that if the
availability of data is compromised, prediction of its con-
tainment time can take less time than the containment of
either confidentiality or integrity. Availability of data is one
of the main points of security issues and organizations since
it provides the retrieval and update of data to support relying
party systems [6]. Data needs to be available whenever and
wherever needed. Therefore, it can be clearly deduced that
the result of the experiments was true since the results in-
dicate that the most relevant security attribute is availability
rather than confidentiality and integrity.
The asset value was the last relevant feature from the
incident details features of the VERIS on containment
time. Asset describes compromised information gains dur-
ing an incident. Before making the results of experi-
ment clear, a table is given to show subtitles of asset
value in the VERIS web site [16]. According to our re-
sults, the most relevant one is ownership. The result is
asset.governance.Personally owned, it means that if the
compromised information is owned personally, its predic-
tion of containment time will be shorter than other assets.
The meaning of ownership in the VERIS is who owns (the
asset) effects on an incident. It can be explained with an
example: if one person’s data confidentiality is affected by
an attack, the sufferer takes care of her data confidentiality
more than others such as her colleagues, her employees, and
so on. From an information security perspective, it makes
the result of experiments meaningful and true.
The following result is related to the response feature
of an incident from the experiments. The response fo-
cuses on the timeline of incidents and aims to answer
these questions: how was the incident covered, what was
the remediation process of it, and how is the discov-
ery of the incident done? The result of experiments:
Timeline.Notification,Timeline. compromise.unit, Time-
line.incident.year, DiscoverymethodExt.customer
Before discussing the results of the experiments, the
Timeline and Discovery method need to be explained based
on the VERIS community database explanations. In the
VERIS, four different types of time line events are ex-
plained: compromise, exfiltration, discovery, and contain-
ment. In our case, the discovery method variety was the
external customer. The time line concept of an incident
depends on the discovery method. It can be made clear
with examples: if an incident is reported by a user, which
is internally reported, the containment time for it can be
predicted. If the actor disclosed the information externally,
then the containment time of it can be predicted as well.
Another discovery method might be from customer: if it
is discovered by customers, containment time of incident
could again be predicted since it is a relevant feature. After
discussing the time line concepts based on the VERIS ex-
planations, we can go back to the experiments‘ results. The
prediction of containment time may be longer or shorter.
The last result is related to victim information. As it is
shown in the result of experiments, victim.state and “vic-
tim.industry.name” are effective features on the contain-
ment time based on our experiment results. If the victim
industry name is known, the containment time of the inci-
dent can be shorter than when it is unknown. The most rel-
evant industries are the healthcare and public industries.
In healthcare and public industries incidents, the prediction
of containment time could be longer than others. The main
idea here is that if the industry name is known, the contain-
ment time can be predicted. Another feature is the victim
state. A clear deduction can be made that an incident‘s con-
tainment time can be predicted if the victim state (country
region) is known. Having discussed relevant features on the
containment time of an incident, it could be seen our work
brings a new view to information security area of organisa-
tions.
VCDB Analysis:
In this part, we are going back to our original data set by
taking our features to analyze each feature’s containment
time. By using its containment timeline concepts, we cre-
ated tables that show percentages of the containment time
concepts.
We claim that if an incoming incident has any of rel-
evant features given to us, then we may be able to tell
its specific time percentage of containment period. Fig-
ure 3 gives percentages of the containment time in each
time period from our original data set. For example, if
the feature is action physical theft, then we can calcu-
late its containment time in the hour period. We used the
formula percentage(p)=specific time period’s containment
time(st)/total containment time that belongs to specific fea-
ture(N) p=st/N. Let us take hour period of time percentage
on physical theft feature containment time, if an incoming
incident has physical theft features, then its percentage of
hourly containment time is 11% (p=118/1038). We have
excluded all cases of unknown times because these cases
are undisclosed. All the following Figures 3–7 represent
the percentage of time units of the containment time corre-
sponding to each features we predicted in our analysis.
Figure 3. Percentage of action physical theft
We created all figures above by using our original data set
(VCDB). Features’ time concepts are different: for exam-
ple, while attribute availability feature has months time con-
cept in our data set, discovery method does not have it. We
calculated all percentages by using the formula (p=st/N).
Figure 4. Asset governance personally owned
Figure 5. Percentages of specific time period
When an incoming incident has any of relevant features, we
can tell its specific containment period of time percentage.
5. Model Development
Based on the experiment findings, relevant features have
contributed to developing an effective containment time
feature model, Figure 8. It is an abstract module that high-
lights relevant features, removing all the schema detail and
impact rating figures. We think that the model could be
useful for people who have no expertise in either VERIS
schema or [19] and its feature selection options. The model
given shows the ratio of features on the containment time
of an incident. Based on Figure 8 we claim that if the
time line concepts of an incident (such as discovery time,
compromise, and exfiltration) are known, then a prediction
about the containment time of that incident can be made so
that organizations make a decision based on their circum-
stances. For example, they may opt for a short time or a
longer time containment strategy. The second feature is the
attribute details. We need to expand on the attribute part
as the availability of attribute was one of the certain areas
in our experiment results. Thus, if the organizations de-
cide to come up with a containment strategy for an incident,
then they need to think about service availabilities such as
sources, network connection etc. Based on Figure 8, it can
be clearly seen that if the security attribute detail affected
is either availability, confidentiality, or integrity, then pre-
diction of its containment time may take less time than the
others. The next feature is victim properties, it makes sense
that if the victim property is known, then the containment
Figure 6. Discovery method time percentages
Figure 7. Victim Properties time percentage
time of incident can be predicted easily. It helps organi-
zations think about their weakest points. The arrows show
that the direction of the effect is from feature side to class
value, which, in our case, is containment time.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed the most relevant features re-
lated to the containment time of Cyber security incidents
as reported in the VERIS open data set of Cyber incidents.
Over 200 features from 6800 records were selected, and
these were then utilized as input through the WEKA fil-
tering algorithms. Thirteen features out of the 200 were
deemed relevant for predicting containment times of inci-
dents. These features could form part of a model of organi-
zations’ information security and could help companies in-
crease their information security levels by focusing on the
most important features when considering the containment
times of incidents.
Future work could focus on widening the scope of the
classes considered to be relevant to express a more general
notion of Cyber response. For example, other times could
be considered, such as incident discovery and data exfil-
tration times. Additionally, other response aspects could
also be included alongside containment time, which would
be triggered by Cyber incidents, e.g., response action types
and the impact of the incidents on the organization.
Figure 8. The model of features relevant to containment time
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